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World Economy in Calm Waters
The economy lost momentum worldwide during the winter half of the year;
the pace of growth was nonetheless strong, however, as financing condi-
tions remained favorable and profits remained high. World growth was cur-
tailed by rising commodity prices and a significant shift to a more restric-
tive economic policy stance in some countries. In addition, further currency
appreciations dampened exports in the euro zone and in Japan.
The pace of global economic growth will not accelerate again over the
forecast period. In the USA, where the upswing is based on persisting lively
investment and enduringly robust private consumption, the recent substan-
tial increase in price pressure suggests that a further tightening of the mon-
etary policy reins will gradually slow the pace. Following a rise of 3.5% this
year, Gross Domestic Product will expand at a somewhat weaker rate _
around 3.2% _ next year (cf. table 1).
In China and other Asian countries, the high growth rates will flatten
out, however. Japan's deflationary trend appears to be gradually coming to
a halt; rising profits, stronger consumption growth, and continuing good
prospects for exports indicate that recovery is likely. GDP in Japan will
increase by 1% this year and probably by 2% next year. Output in East
Asia as a whole will expand both this year and next year by around 4.5%.
However, there are a number of risks threatening the world economy.
These include the ongoing expansion of the USA's current account deficit as
well as developments on the commodity markets. The imbalance in the
USA's export economy is viewed with particular concern on the financial
markets, in part because the resulting portfolio restructuring could well
intensify the upward pressure on the currencies of other regions and in
itself curb their competitiveness. However, it is unclear as yet when this
might occur and who exactly might have to bear the burden of adjustment.
Thus, for example, at present the U.S. current account deficit is substan-
tially and increasingly sustained by the fact that Asian central banks are
purchasing U.S. government bonds; the share of the U.S. government debt
held by non-private foreign investors rose in recent years by around 10 per-
centage points and currently accounts for over 25% of the public debt. As
long as the financial market actors are willing to finance the U.S. current
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low by historical standards _ there is no further risk of
significant currency appreciations in other regions.
Overall, then, a similar situation to that found in the
Bretton Woods system, with fixed but adjustable
exchange rates, seems to be emerging. There is a US dol-
lar currency zone with an anchor currency country (high
current account deficit, investment and transaction cur-
rency) and a group of peripheral countries relying on
export-driven growth in a context of exchange rates that
threaten to appreciate and therefore tend to be underval-
ued. An ideal example is China, which in recent years
has defied all upward currency trends by buying mas-
sive quantities of dollars _ occasionally spending dou-
ble-figure billions per month _ and has maintained its
Table 1
Real GDP, Consumer Prices and Unemployment Rate in Selected Countries
Weight
(%)
GDP Consumer prices1 Unemployment rate2




2004 2005 2006 2004 2005 2006 2004 2005 2006
Germany 8.8 – 1.6 0.9 1.5 1.7 1.6 1.4 9.5 10.3 9.5
F r a n c e 6 . 6 1 2 . 92 . 31 . 72 . 22 . 31 . 81 . 59 . 69 . 99 . 7
Italy 5.5 9.0 1.2 –0.7 1.0 2.3 2.0 1.8 8.1 8.1 8.3
Spain 3.2 6.3 3.1 3.5 3.1 3.0 3.2 3.2 10.8 10.0 9.5
Netherlands 1.9 7.8 1.4 0.4 1.8 1.4 1.2 –2.5 4.7 5.1 5.0
B e l g i u m 1 . 17 . 12 . 91 . 52 . 31 . 92 . 11 . 87 . 88 . 07 . 8
A u s t r i a 1 . 06 . 82 . 01 . 82 . 21 . 92 . 01 . 94 . 54 . 64 . 4
Greece 0.7 1.3 4.2 2.3 2.5 3.0 3.2 2.8 10.4 10.5 10.5
F i n l a n d 0 . 61 . 13 . 32 . 43 . 00 . 20 . 61 . 58 . 98 . 78 . 5
Ireland 0.6 1.2 5.4 4.5 5.0 2.3 2.0 2.4 4.5 4.2 4.0
Portugal 0.5 0.7 1.0 0.3 1.8 2.5 1.9 1.9 6.7 7.3 7.2
Luxembourg 0.1 0.6 4.5 3.8 4.0 3.2 3.6 2.8 4.2 4.5 4.2
EMU countries3 3 0 . 6 –2 . 01 . 21 . 92 . 11 . 91 . 58 . 89 . 08 . 7
EMU countries excl. Germany3 2 1 . 8 –2 . 21 . 32 . 12 . 32 . 11 . 68 . 58 . 58 . 4
EMU countries excl. Germany4 – 5 4 . 72 . 21 . 42 . 12 . 12 . 01 . 3 – – –
Great Britain 6.9 10.5 3.1 2.7 2.7 1.3 1.8 1.9 4.7 4.8 4.8
Sweden 1.1 2.7 3.5 2.8 2.3 1.0 0.8 1.5 6.4 6.0 5.9
Denmark 0.8 1.9 2.4 2.2 1.9 0.9 2.0 1.7 5.4 5.3 5.2
EU-153 3 9 . 5 –2 . 31 . 52 . 11 . 91 . 91 . 68 . 08 . 28 . 0
Poland 0.8 3.2 5.5 2.5 4.0 3.6 2.4 2.3 18.8 17.8 17.4
Czech Republic 0.3 3.1 4.4 4.2 4.4 2.8 1.5 2.1 8.3 8.1 7.9
Hungary 0.3 2.1 4.1 3.4 3.8 6.8 3.8 4.3 5.9 6.4 6.3
Slovakia 0.1 1.0 5.5 5.0 4.7 7.5 2.4 2.8 18.0 15.6 15.1
Slovenia 0.1 0.5 4.6 2.7 3.8 3.6 2.0 2.0 6.0 5.9 5.7
Lithuania 0.1 0.3 6.7 5.8 7.0 1.2 2.3 2.4 10.8 8.2 7.2
Latvia 0.0 0.1 8.5 6.8 6.0 6.2 6.4 6.2 9.8 9.3 8.8
Estonia 0.0 0.1 6.1 7.0 5.5 3.0 3.3 3.1 9.2 7.8 7.0
S w i t z e r l a n d 1 . 24 . 81 . 72 . 02 . 00 . 80 . 80 . 84 . 43 . 83 . 6
Norway 0.8 0.9 2.9 2.6 2.4 0.6 1.8 2.0 4.4 4.3 4.2
Western and central Europe3 4 3 . 4 –2 . 41 . 62 . 22 . 01 . 91 . 68 . 88 . 98 . 6
U S A 3 8 . 1 1 1 . 14 . 43 . 53 . 22 . 73 . 33 . 05 . 55 . 25 . 0
Japan 15.3 2.2 2.7 1.0 2.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 4.7 4.6 4.4
Canada 3.2 0.8 2.8 2.7 2.8 1.8 1.9 2.0 7.2 7.0 6.9
Total3 100.0 – 3.2 2.3 2.6 1.9 2.1 1.9 7.1 6.9 6.7
Total excl. Germany3 9 1 . 2 –3 . 42 . 42 . 72 . 02 . 22 . 06 . 86 . 66 . 4
Memo item: 
Total weighted by exports4 – 100.0 2.9 2.1 2.5 2.2 2.0 1.7 – – –
1 EU-15 and Norway: harmonized index of consumer prices. — 2 Standardized. — 3 Total of countries listed. GDP and consumer prices weighted by 2003 GDP in US dollars;
unemployment rate weighted by 2004 labour force. — 4 Total of countries listed. Weighted by countries' shares in German exports 2004.
Sources: OECD Economic Outlook; Eurostat; National Accounts; national statistics and DIW Berlin calculations; 2005 to 2006: DIW Berlin estimate and prognosis.DIW Berlin Weekly Report No. 21/2005  245
high level of competitiveness by means of this strategy.
The central banks concerned basically have unlimited
possibilities for intervention (unlike those of countries
whose currencies are at risk of depreciation and which
are threatened by potential outward flows of foreign
currencies) because there are no restrictions on the
amount of the local currency that can be issued. This is
why there is much to suggest that the situation will
remain stable over the forecast period.246 DIW Berlin Weekly Report No. 21/2005
The Economy
of the European Union
Stronger growth
in the non-EMU countries
The non-EMU economies of the European Union grew
much more robustly on average than the countries in the
euro zone. Macroeconomic growth in Great Britain has
remained on a upward trajectory since last year. The
growth trend was sustained in particular by business
investments and public spending. But private consump-
tion also expanded perceptibly, albeit at a somewhat
slower pace. The external balance remained unmistak-
ably negative, however.
The Bank of England had raised base rates from
3.5% to 4.75% between 2003 and summer 2004 with a
view to averting inflationary risks, especially in the
property sector. Now, following the boom in housing
property, it seems that the sought-after soft landing has
actually been achieved; the Bank of England did not fur-
ther increase base rates as was initially expected. Fiscal
policy, which had bolstered growth in recent years by
means of sharp increases in spending on infrastructure
measures and the health system, is gradually swinging
to a moderate path. The budget deficit, which had risen
to around 3.5% last year, will probably be reduced to
around 3% this year if the economy remains strong; fis-
cal policy will therefore exert a slightly restrictive effect.
Growth will presumably amount to over 2.5% next
year. Thus, real GDP will rise at almost the same pace
as potential growth. The inflation rate will remain some-
where in the vicinity of the reference value of 2%. The
unemployment rate will remain entrenched at almost
5%, which is low compared with other European coun-
tries.
Growth has weakened overall in the new member
states of the EU _ and especially in the countries of cen-
tral Europe _ since the beginning of the year. The rea-
sons have been both slower export growth and a slow-
down in the pace of domestic demand growth. Private
consumer spending was dampened both by higher infla-
tion rates following accession to the EU and by wage
agreements. In some countries, the expansion of govern-
ment consumption spending also diminished. The slow-
down is most evident in Poland. But despite weaker
demand from the euro zone, some countries managed to
improve their external trade balance in the first quarter
of the year. For example, the Czech Republic achieved a
surplus in the balance of trade for the first time in a
number of years. This was due not least to the inaugura-
tion of export-oriented production plants. 
In the Baltic countries, by contrast, growth remained
robust and continued to be accompanied by substantial
imbalances in foreign trade. Latvia, in particular, where
the inflation rate has fallen only marginally since the
middle of last year, showed signs of overheating. In
most of the other countries prices calmed down _ despite
the price pressure exerted by energy products _ as the
effects of indirect tax increases related to joining the EU
expired. Unemployment rates are comparatively high,
although some countries saw a significant decline.
Growth in the new member states will continue to
exceed the EU average over the forecast period. This
will be due, in addition to the recovery of the economy in
the euro zone, to a livening up of domestic demand. Con-
sumption will not show any significant momentum,
however, in view of moderate wage growth and efforts
to consolidate the public budgets. Investment growth,
by contrast, will accelerate, not least thanks to assis-
tance from the EU.
Six countries have been participating in the ERM II
exchange rate mechanism since April; the new members
_ in addition to Estonia, Lithuania, and Slovenia, which
had already joined ERM II last summer _ are Latvia,
Malta, and Cyprus. The latter two countries were admit-
ted on condition that they reduce their budget deficits,
while Latvia must reduce its inflation rate in the long
term. During the forecast period, convergence reports
will be drawn up for the first three countries, in which
compliance with the Maastricht criteria will be moni-
tored. At the moment, only Slovenia fulfills the criterion
of moderate inflation rates; at 4.6%, inflation in Estonia
has significantly exceeded the reference value of 2.7%
since the beginning of the year. 
Weak momentum in the euro zone
The economic situation in the euro zone has deteriorated
further since the beginning of the year. While the
growth rate of real GDP _ 0.5% in the first quarter of the
year compared with the previous quarter _ showed an
improvement, this was only due to the high rate in Ger-
many, which greatly exaggerated the actual strength of
economic growth in the country. The pace of growth
slowed in most of the countries in the euro zone; real
GDP growth in the euro zone (not including Germany)
amounted to only 0.1%.
The sharp downturn in the pace of growth was
caused mainly by external trade. Real exports in the
euro zone (excluding Germany) fell by almost 2% in the
first quarter of the year, and this decline was much
stronger than the fall in imports. Since mid-2004, the
increase in the price of oil coupled with the appreciationDIW Berlin Weekly Report No. 21/2005  247
of the exchange rate against the US dollar has curbed
economic expansion. Another relevant issue is the fact
that regions experiencing dynamic growth, such as the
Asian countries or indeed the new member states of the
EU, are expanding their market shares. This develop-
ment is affecting countries such as Portugal and Italy, in
particular, which have substantial proportions of labor-
intensive industry and whose unit labor costs have risen
comparatively sharply in recent years.
Domestic factors just about compensated for the
decline in external demand, although private consump-
tion rose at a weaker rate in the first quarter of the year
than in the final quarter of 2004. Fixed capital formation
in the euro zone (excluding Germany) expanded only
slightly, especially as a result of the weak growth in
equipment investments. One possible explanation for
this development is the fact that in addition to the
weaker level of capacity utilization, it is also particularly
difficult to pass on higher oil and commodity prices to
final prices when the economy is in a lull. Uncertainty
about future oil prices is an additional factor.
Employment rose slightly according to preliminary
data from a number of member states. The decline in
employment in the manufacturing industry was more
than offset by a rise in employment in the service sector.
The unemployment rate in the euro zone has amounted
to almost 9% since the beginning of the year.
The inflation rate is fluctuating around 2%. Price
pressure is currently exerted mainly by energy prices,
which were 10% higher in April than one year previ-
ously. On the other hand, the core inflation rate (Harmo-
nized Index of Consumer Prices excluding alcoholic bev-
erages, tobacco, foodstuffs, and energy), at 1.3%, was
much lower in April; the HICP has been falling since the
beginning of the year as a consequence of slowing eco-
nomic activity, but also because of the nominal appreci-
ation of the euro.
The pace of growth will pick up in the second half of
the year. The dampening effects exerted by the oil price
and the exchange rate are likely to wear off; in addition,
financing conditions will show some improvement.
Investments will therefore grow again at a stronger rate.
Private consumption will also expand at a faster pace
as, given relatively steady income growth, the savings
ratio decreases to an extent and the burden exerted by
the oil price lightens. The expansion of the world econ-
omy will continue to bolster exports. Nonetheless, the
external balance of many countries will not improve as
competitive pressure from Asia and from the new mem-
ber states of the EU remains strong. This applies espe-
cially to Italy and Portugal.
Growth of 1.2% is expected for the euro zone overall
this year, while it is likely to amount to 1.3% for the
eleven EMU countries excluding Germany. The unem-
ployment rate will amount to 9% this year and to 8.7%
next year. The inflation rate will fall slightly as the
effects of the oil-price rise wear off, amounting to an
annual average of 1.9% in 2005 (1.5% in 2006).
Monetary situation:
renewed rise in real interest rates
Short-term (three-month) interest rates in the euro zone
have been fixed at 2.1% (cf. figure 1) for two years now.
Measured against the core inflation rate, however, short-
term rates have actually risen in real terms since last
fall, from 0.1% in November to 0.7% on the most recent
figures. The yields on government bonds maturing
within ten years were 3.6% on recent figures, which cor-
responds to around 1.75% in real terms. These are low
rates by historical standards. Nonetheless, the rise in
real short-term interest rates is still exerting a dampen-
ing influence. On the other hand, the monetary parame-
ters have recently improved again as a result of the
depreciation of the euro, having passed through a tem-
porarily more restrictive period at the beginning of the
year.
This forecast is based on the assumption that, in
view of the threat of a slowdown in growth in the euro
zone, the European Central Bank will reduce base rates
by half a percentage point in mid-2005 and subse-
quently leave them unchanged at this level. Given the
very moderate level of wage growth, this would not rep-
resent any threat to price stability. Money supply
growth will likewise not represent an inflationary risk,
which is considered possible at the earliest in the
medium term. 
Fiscal policy slightly restrictive
The situation of the public budgets has deteriorated sig-
nificantly in the euro zone in recent years _ primarily as
a consequence of the disappointing rate of economic
growth. The aggregate deficit amounted to 2.7% of GDP
in 2004 (cf. table 2); at the beginning of this year, DIW
Berlin had still expected a noticeable improvement in
2005 and 2006. On current figures, such a positive trend
can no longer be expected. On the one hand, the pace of
economic growth is much weaker. On the other, the bud-
get situation is less favorable than previously in a range
of countries following the revision of the systems used
in the calculation of the national accounts. In most cases,
the systematic revision of the accounts has a positive
effect on the deficit ratio, because GDP generally works248 DIW Berlin Weekly Report No. 21/2005
out higher under the new method, but in an increasing
number of countries the data is being revised to correct
past (occasionally deliberate) false entries, which is lead-
ing to much higher past deficits and also past deficit
ratios. The higher base figures will influence the result
over the forecast period.
This year, as last year, the aggregate deficit in the
euro zone will amount to at least 2.8% of GDP; as the
growth trend remains weak, 2006 will also fail to bring
any improvement.
Table 2
Public Budget Financial Balance1 for the 
EMU Countries, 2001 to 2006
As % of nominal GDP2
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Germany –2.8 –3.6 –3.8 –3.6 –3.5 –3.2
France –1.5 –3.2 –4.2 –3.7 –3.3 –3.1
Italy –2.6 –2.6 –3.1 –3.1 –3.7 –4.4
Spain –0.4 –0.3 0.3 –0.3 0.1 0.1
Netherlands 0.0 –1.9 –3.2 –2.5 –2.3 –1.9
Belgium 0.5 0.1 0.4 0.1 –0.3 –0.4
Austria 0.3 –0.2 –1.1 –1.3 –2.0 –1.8
Finland 5.2 4.3 2.5 2.1 1.7 1.7
Greece –3.7 –4.1 –5.2 –6.1 –5.0 –4.1
Portugal –4.4 –2.7 –2.9 –2.9 –6.5 –6.0
Ireland 0.9 –0.4 0.2 1.3 –0.8 –0.5
Luxembourg 6.4 2.3 0.5 –1.1 –1.3 –1.6
EMU countries2 –1.6 –2.4 –2.8 –2.7 –2.8 –2.7
1 As % of gross domestic product; apportionment according to Maastricht Treaty. 
— 2 Total of countries listed. Weighted by 2004 GDP in euro.
Sources: ECB; Eurostat; European Commission; 2005 and 2006: DIW Berlin esti-
mate and prognosis.
Figure 1
The Monetary Situation in the Euro Zone
January 1999 to April 2005
DIW Berlin 2005
1 Lending rates from January 2003 onwards: 1 to 5 years, up to 1 million euro. —
2 Prior to 1998: exchange rate between US dollar and 'synthetic' euro. — 3 Relative
to a broad range of countries, based on consumer prices.
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The German Economy
Overview: no hope of a robust upturn
Hopes of an upturn in the German economy this year
have not yet been fulfilled, although the first quarter of
the year saw growth increase by a full 1% on the previ-
ous quarter. The optimism was based on the expectation
that the huge impetus exerted by the export sector
would spread to the domestic economy, leading there _
via livelier demand for investment goods _ to higher
incomes and increased consumer demand. This, how-
ever, did not come to pass, although the trend for foreign
demand remained very positive and investment in
machinery and equipment (e.g., copyrights and self-pro-
duced software) also expanded. The main obstacle to a
more positive macroeconomic trend is the weak level of
private consumer spending, which is mainly a conse-
quence of low income growth rates and unfavorable
labor market prospects. The lack of investment in the
construction sector is also curtailing growth. In addition,
despite the tax cuts, the public budgets are not provid-
ing expansionary impulses.
The apparent good start to this year disguises the
weak basic economic trend and is actually the expres-
sion of a split development. The spark from the boom-
ing export economy has failed to ignite domestic
demand. The surprisingly high growth rate in the first
quarter was due exclusively to the brisk expansion of
foreign trade; private and government consumption
spending fell by 0.6% adjusted for prices (cf. figure 2).
The growth rate was inflated by a technical effect, that
is, by the adjustment for seasonal and calendar-related
influences. 
A contrary effect came into play in the second quar-
ter. A glance at the average for the last three quarters
indicates the weak basic economic trend. From the
fourth quarter of 2004 to the second quarter of 2005
(estimated figures), the growth rate amounted to only
0.3%. The second quarter can also be expected to show
an unfavorable result as incoming orders in manufactur-
ing industry decreased slightly in the first quarter, while
the confidence indicators also deteriorated. The decisive
factor behind the decline in orders was a fall in domestic
orders. At the same time, the Ifo Business Climate Index
for the industrial sector continued to weaken, while the
estimates of the economic trend provided by financial
analysts surveyed by the Centre for European Economic
Research (ZEW) were also more negative than previ-
ously. One likely important reason for the pessimism are
the persisting high oil prices. The recent depreciation of
the euro, by contrast, had not had any effect at the time
the survey was carried out.
DIW Berlin expects that while the economic lull will
be slowly overcome in the second half of the year, the
recovery will be only moderate (for the assumptions
underlying this forecast, cf. box 1). The positive
impulses will continue to be provided virtually exclu-
sively by external demand. The recent depreciation of
the euro is likely to help German enterprises further
improve their competitiveness on foreign markets out-
side the euro zone, with the consequence that their mar-
ket shares will expand. This will at least compensate for
the slight drop in demand for German products result-
ing from the somewhat slower pace of world growth. In
addition, the oil-exporting economies will increasingly
use their oil earnings to purchase investment goods on
the world markets. German industry is likely to benefit
especially from this development. Oil prices themselves
are unlikely to exert any additional dampening effects
on the German economy. Once the inhibiting effects of
the oil-price rise wear off, private households will not
suffer any further loss in real income. Nonetheless,
domestic demand will remain weak because it will be
difficult for consumption to recover in view of the low
rate of income growth. Government demand is also
more likely to exert restrictive effects.
All in all, an average real GDP growth rate of 0.9%
can be expected this year (cf. table 3). In order to quan-
Assumptions underlying the prognosis
This forecast is based on the following assumptions:
–  The ECB will reduce base rates over the course of this year by 50 basis points and will leave them unchanged at this level
until the end of the forecast period.
–  The price of oil will fall to US $ 48 per barrel (North Sea Brent) over the course of the year and will remain unchanged at this
level until the end of the forecast period.
–  The euro/dollar exchange rate will amount to US $ 1.22 per euro and will not change over the course of the forecast period.
–  Negotiated wages will rise both this year and next year at the same rate as in 2004.
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Figure 2
GDP and Important Components
1 Price- and seasonally adjusted (chain-linked index 2000 = 100). — 2 Change (%) on the previous quarter, annualized rate (right-hand scale). — 3 Change (%) of the original 
values on the previous year.
Sources: Federal Statistical Office; DIW Berlin calculations.
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tify the risks for the forecast, simulation calculations
were carried out using the NiGEM model. The aim was
to show how the forecast would be affected when certain
assumptions were made about the oil price, the
exchange rate, and interest rates (cf. box 2).
Real GDP is expected to rise by 1.5% in 2006. Seen
from today's perspective, there is little reason to hope
that the economy can shift to a steeper growth trajec-
tory. The trend will still be sustained by the expansion
of foreign trade. There is no sign of the economy cooling
Table 3
Key Forecast Figures for Germany, 2001 to 2006
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Gross domestic product1 (percentage change over previous year) 1.2 0.2 0.0 1.6 0.9 1.5
Gainfully employed2 (in 000s)  39 315 39 092 38 720 38 861 39 084 39 404
Unemployed (in 000s)  3 853 4 060 4 377 4 381 4 787 4 451
Unemployment rate3 (as a percentage)  8.9 9.4 10.2 10.1 10.9 10.1
Not gainfully employed4 (in 000s)  2 923 3 224 3 686 3 931 4 039 3 701
Percentage not gainfully employed5 6.9 7.6 8.7 9.2 9.4 8.6
Consumer prices6 (percentage change over the previous year)  2.0 1.4 1.0 1.7 1.6 1.4
Unit labour costs7 (percentage change over the previous year) 0.8 0.7 0.5 -0.9 0.0 0.0
Public sector financial balance8
Euro billion –58.6 –77.4 –81.4 –80.0 –78.0 –74.8
As % of nominal GDP –2.8 –3.6 –3.8 –3.6 –3.5 –3.2
1 Price-adjusted (chain-linked index 2000 = 100). — 2 National (annual average based on quarterly figures). — 3 Unemployed as a percentage of the national workforce. — 
4 In accordance with the convention of the International Labour Organization (ILO). — 5 Persons not gainfully employed as a percentage of the national workforce. — 6 Price 
index for the cost of living of all private households. — 7 Labour costs (compensation of employees per employee) in relation to labour productivity (price-adjusted gross 
domestic product, chain-linked index 2000 = 100) per person gainfully employed. — 8 As defined by the national income and expenditure accounts (ESVG95 – Europäisches 
System volkswirtschaftlicher Gesamtrechnungen – European System of Integrated Economic Accounts).
Sources: Federal Statistical Office; German Bundesbank; DIW Berlin calculations; 2005 and 2006: DIW Berlin estimate and prognosis.
Assumptions underlying the prognosis
NiGEM is a multi-country macro-econometric structural model
which groups all the important industrialized countries as well
as the OPEC countries and numerous threshold countries in
separate blocks. The impact of the oil price is mainly exerted
via the price trend and the shift in exchange relationships;
exchange rates and interest rates have a direct effect via
gains or losses in competitiveness and via the impact on
investment and consumption decisions. Endogenous reac-
tions on the part of monetary and fiscal policy are taken into
account by means of reaction functions.
The following specific scenarios were examined:
–  a long-term rise in the oil price by US $ 25 per barrel
–  a long-term fall in the oil price by US $ 10 per barrel
–  a long-term effective appreciation of the euro by 5%
–  a temporary interest-rate reduction by 50 basis points for
three years
The results of simulations based on the model can be used to
illustrate the effects of changes in exogenous variables on the
forecast (cf. table).
Table 4
Results of Simulation using NIGEM Model
Deviation from base simulation as percentage points
Scenario










(US $ +25 per barrel) –0.4 –0.3 0.4 0.1
Oil price
(US $ –10 per barrel) 0.2 0.1 –0.2 0.0
Appreciation (5%) –0.2 –0.1 –0.3 –0.1
Interest-rate reduction
(0.5 percentage points) 0.1 0.0 0.05 0.05
Source: DIW Berlin calculations.
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down in the important export regions. On the contrary, a
slight acceleration is more likely, especially in Europe.
Growth will continue to be impeded by excessively
weak domestic demand, for there is no sign of a funda-
mental change for the better in this respect. Mass
incomes will continue to rise only moderately, and no
further tax cuts will enter into force. The reduction in
capital market interest rates could provide a slight
boost.
Individual trends
Private consumer spending showed a disappointing
trend in the first quarter of 2005 (a decline of 0.2% on
the previous quarter) given that tax cuts had entered
into force at the beginning of the year, raising dispos-
able income by over 6 billion euro this year. However,
some of this income will flow into savings as _ com-
pared with the other income brackets _ high incomes
benefit to an above-average extent from the tax relief. In
addition, private households are facing a range of addi-
tional burdens, for example, reduced unemployment
assistance or social benefits, and higher contribution
rates for health insurance and (in some cases) nursing-
care insurance. Growing job uncertainty is likely to be
an even more important factor, in addition to income
losses through the abolition of (paid) overtime and spe-
cial bonuses. Even if it can be assumed for the further
course of the year that private consumer spending will
expand to some extent, in real terms 2005 will bring
only a slight improvement on the previous year, namely
0.3%. Private consumption will thus remain the main
stumbling block on the road to recovery.
The coming year also fails to promise any profound
change. There will be no relief from taxes or social secu-
rity contributions, on balance, but equally no additional
burdens are planned (for example, the abolition of tax
concessions). Given that no further rise in oil prices is
assumed in the forecast, the real value of disposable
income will increase at a somewhat stronger rate than
this year. As the savings ratio declines slightly, a 0.8%
rise in real consumer spending can be expected.
The rise in the cost of living will remain moderate as
a consequence of the weak rate of economic growth.
This year will see substantial price rises implemented
by energy suppliers, whose prices are adjusted to the oil-
price trend following a certain time lag. Administered
prices will also rise at an above-average rate. The bur-
den of these factors will gradually diminish over the
forecast period. All in all, the average inflation rate will
amount to 1.4% this year; an inflation rate of 1.1% is
forecast for next year.
The recovery since last year of investments in
machinery and other equipment will continue. This will
mainly be a consequence of the export boom and the
very favorable financing conditions. Investment condi-
tions are likely to remain favorable over the forecast
period, as are the profitability prospects of enterprises
as unit labor costs continue to fall. The yield on ten-year
government bonds will still be extremely low by histori-
cal standards, while share prices will stabilize at a high
level. This will facilitate the financing of investments.
However, investment activity will be dampened by the
weak level of domestic demand, for the sales expecta-
tions of enterprises are the most important motivator
behind capacity expansions. All in all, investments in
machinery and other equipment are likely to rise this
year by almost 4% and by over 5% next year.
The downward trend in construction investments
will continue. The decline actually intensified in the first
quarter of this year, although this was partly due to bad
weather conditions. A renewed negative trend for the
construction industry can be expected over the forecast
period, as is indicated by the figures for construction
permits and incoming orders. The main reason for the
bad prospects is the high number of vacancies in hous-
ing and office property. In addition, construction prices
have been rising more rapidly because of the sharp price
increases for steel products since last year. This situa-
tion will reduce the profitability prospects of commercial
investors in rental housing and offices. Numerous con-
struction projects for which permits have already been
acquired in anticipation of the abolition of the subsidy
for owner-occupied housing construction are not likely
to be concluded; one reason are the stagnating incomes
of private households. Moreover, in view of the strained
financial situation of the local authorities, public con-
struction investments are likely to decline again this
year at the least. All in all, construction investments will
fall by 6% on annual average in 2005 and by 1% in
2006.
Exports are the pillar of economic growth. While
they lost a degree of momentum in the second half of
last year as a result of the slight downturn in the world
economy, they returned to an upward trajectory in the
first quarter of this year (for the regional trends for Ger-
man exports, cf. figure 3). The conditions for exporters
will remain favorable over the forecast period: The
world economy has overcome its weak phase, while the
recent depreciation of the euro will provide an additional
boost. The competitiveness of enterprises will also be
improved by the ongoing decrease in labor costs. Export
growth is estimated to amount to over 6% this year and
to over 8% next year. By contrast, imports will rise only
slightly in real terms this year. This will be mainly due
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Import growth will be somewhat stronger next year as
the economy strengthens. While net exports will rise
robustly this year as a result of the disparity between
the export and import trends, they will grow at a much
weaker rate next year. The terms of trade are likely to
decline. The main reason is the fact that the high prices
for oil and commodity imports will now no longer be
curtailed by the rise in the exchange rate, rather imports
will become more expensive as a result of the euro's
depreciation.
The labor market trend is showing the effects of
labor market policy measures; thus, the numbers of
'mini-jobs', 'Ich AG' business start-ups, and supplemen-
tary jobs have all expanded significantly. The number
of employees subject to mandatory social insurance
illustrates the basic economic trend even more clearly
(cf. figure 4). This figure will probably decline further
this year (by 0.5%), while a negligible increase (0.1%)
can be expected next year. The number of people in mar-
ginal employment and supplementary jobs is likely to
increase by 300 000, respectively, within two years,
however. The number of unemployed is also distorted
by labor market policy interventions, in this case the
fusion of unemployment assistance and social welfare
benefits. Thus, most of the high number of new unem-
ployed this year are former social welfare beneficiaries
and relatives of former recipients of unemployment
assistance who are now looking for work.
Public budgets:
Slight decline in deficits
The public budget deficit can be expected to decline
only slightly this year _ from 80 billion euro to 78 billion
euro. At 3.5% of nominal GDP, the deficit will again
Figure 3
Regional Trends for German Foreign Trade1
1 Special trade, nominal; seasonally adjusted according to Berlin method (BV4);
moving three-month average.
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exceed the limit stipulated in the Stability and Growth
Pact, despite the fact that savings _ some of them
extremely substantial _ will be made at all levels of the
budget. The fact that the deficits will not decline to a
greater extent this year is due, on the one hand, to the
income-tax reductions amounting to 15 billion euro that
entered into force at the beginning of the year; on the
other, the weak economy will curtail the growth in gov-
ernment revenue. The deficits are likely to decline only
marginally next year, too _ to 75 billion euro; this would
correspond to 3.3% of nominal GDP.
Apart from the impact of the tax cuts, the trend for
tax revenue this year will be characterized by a weak
increase in wage tax and an acute rise in corporation
tax. With respect to wage tax, the effect of the progres-
sive tax rate will remain negligible as a result of the only
marginal rise in earned income, while the extremely
favorable rate of profit growth will expand the income
earned from corporation tax; business tax will also show
a renewed perceptible increase following its upward
leap last year, as will assessed income tax. Turnover
tax, a source of substantial revenue, will grow at only a
below-average rate compared with the macroeconomic
tax base as growth will be borne primarily by exports,
which are not subject to this levy. Revenue from min-
eral-oil tax will fall as consumers react to the high price
of oil with consumption restraint. All in all, tax revenue
is likely to rise by only 0.6%. An increase of 2.2% is
expected for next year. Even then, because of the weak
rate of wage growth, income from wage tax will increase
only slightly, while profits tax will continue to expand
briskly. Domestic demand will liven up only slowly, so
that consumption-related taxes are likely to rise only
moderately.
Income from contributions to the social security
funds will rise at much the same rate this year as tax
revenue. Here, too, the reason is to be found in the
income and employment trends. Contribution rates will
remain stable overall. Next year, the contribution rates
to statutory health insurance will probably be reduced
to some extent; all in all, revenue from contributions will
rise by 1%. This negligible increase means the govern-
ment contribution to pension insurance will require
stocking up.
Special factors come into play with respect to other
types of revenue. For example, a number of federal
states will be receiving retrospective interest payments
on assets they had transferred to their federal State
banks in the past; this situation will result in one-off
payments amounting to over 3 billion euro. All in all, the
government's revenue will probably increase by 1% this
year. A similar rate of increase can be expected next
year, although no special factors are included in the cal-
culation.
The spending side will see only a slight increase this
year (0.6%). Personnel spending will continue to decline
as jobs are shed and public service revenue rises only
marginally. Social benefits in kind will increase moder-
ately following last year's decline. It is difficult to pre-
dict the trend for monetary social benefits because of the
impact of the comprehensive labor market reforms.
Moreover, the unfavorable situation on the labor market
must also be taken into account; the number of benefi-
ciaries is much higher than last year. The fact that pen-
sions will not be raised will curb spending, but at the
same time the number of pensioners will increase. On
balance, spending will not decline, as originally hoped
by the German government, rather will actually rise
slightly (0.6%). Spending on subsidies and other govern-
ment transfers will be reduced compared with last year.
Public investment is also likely to decline, although the
financial situation of the municipalities will improve dis-
cernibly. Interest spending will expand appreciably
(3%), by contrast, as a result of the high level of new
debt. The rise will be curbed by the fact that when debts
are restructured the local authorities will benefit from
the low interest rate, although this effect will become
less significant.
Next year the austere spending policy is likely to be
maintained; the rise in government spending will proba-
bly amount to less than 1%. Wages in the public service
will not be increased and further jobs will be shed. Mon-
etary social benefits will also expand only slightly. The
situation in the pension funds will consist of a growing
number of beneficiaries, on one side, faced by stagnat-
ing pensions, on the other, as pension rates are again not
raised. The burden on the unemployment insurance sys-
tem is likely to be eased somewhat as a result of the
Hartz IV labor market reforms and the fact that the
number of unemployed will not rise any further. By con-
trast, social benefits in kind will increase again once the
effects of the health reform have worn off. A change in
trend can be expected with respect to public investment
spending because the local authorities are likely to have
greater resources available again for investment pur-
poses. Interest spending will expand sharply as a result
of the high level of new debt.
All in all, fiscal policy will exert slightly restrictive
effects both this year and next year on the overall
demand trend. The expansionary effects of the tax cuts
will actually be more than offset by the restrictive
effects on the spending side.DIW Berlin Weekly Report No. 21/2005  255
Economic Policy
The German economy is suffering immensely from its
excessively weak level of domestic demand. This prob-
lem manifested itself even more clearly than previously
during the temporary lull in world economic growth.
Mass income is stagnating, and government spending
cuts are curtailing the expansionary effects of the tax
reductions. Persisting gloomy labor market prospects
are undermining consumer confidence with respect to
the future and impeding the required decrease in the
savings ratio. Domestic demand is very unlikely to
recover without expansionary impulses from economic
policy. Even an export boom of the caliber of that of
recent years will never mature into an upswing if
domestic demand remains curbed by the economic pol-
icy parameters.
Fiscal policy
Fiscal policy makers will once again fail to achieve the
goal they laid down in their stability program; this year
they planned to reduce the government deficit to 3%.
Next year's deficit is also likely to be higher than the tar-
get originally pursued by the federal government. The
reason for the renewed failure to meet the target is
purely economical; the pace of recovery is much weaker
than expected by almost all professional forecasters.
Nonetheless, a growing number of politicians are calling
for a rapid reduction of the deficit instead of waiting for
the 'automatic stabilizers' to take effect _ even though
the reform of the Stability and Growth Pact has
increased fiscal policy's room for maneuver to combat
unfavorable economic developments. Thus, for example,
an excessive deficit procedure can be averted if real
GDP growth remains extremely marginal over a long-
term period; this was only possible to date if GDP
growth declined by at least 2% within a single year.
Policy makers have responded appropriately thus
far to the decline in the overall prospects of the economy
and have not implemented any further austerity agree-
ments. In any case, spending policy is already character-
ized by extreme moderation _ as it has been for all the
past years; this year, too, a substantial portion of the tax
cuts are to be 'financed' via spending cuts. There is no
doubt that in the current situation a renewed reduction
of government spending would further weaken the econ-
omy and consequently also the revenue basis for the
public budgets. Tax increases would also be detrimental
to growth if the additional revenue were used to reduce
the government deficit. Disposable income and, as a con-
sequence, the demand potential of private households
and/or enterprises would diminish without any addi-
tional demand being created in the public sector. The
only way to avoid a reduction in private demand would
be if the accumulation of savings decreased to the same
degree in these sectors.
The debate centers around the question of an
increase in value-added tax. But budget consolidation is
not the only possible advantage cited. Another reason
given in favor of a VAT rise is that it would create room
for maneuver either for urgent spending, especially in
the domain of education, research, and transportation, or
for rescheduling in the social insurance system. Advo-
cates of this solution argue that VAT is particularly
suitable because it is low in Germany compared with the
European average. Different issues must be taken into
consideration here.
A rise in VAT in itself weakens consumer demand
to the extent that enterprises manage to fully pass on
the higher tax rates to consumers via prices. This is
more likely to succeed during a phase of burgeoning
rather than weak demand; when demand conditions are
unfavorable, the process of passing on takes longer, and
the profits of enterprises are diminished. Because of the
slightly regressive distribution effect, the burden is par-
ticularly heavy on households with a high consumption
rate (and with a lower income). However, tax exemp-
tions (housing rent, pharmaceuticals, medical services)
and allowances (foodstuffs, books, periodicals) apprecia-
bly reduce this effect. Only an average around 60% of
the consumer spending of all private households is
taxed at the normal rate, while 15% is subject to the
reduced rate, and 25% is not taxed at all. If the with-
drawal of purchasing power is offset by a reduction in
savings, then the restrictive effect of the tax increase
diminishes.
Other effects can be expected when the higher
income from the VAT increase is spent again. There is
an urgent need for increased public investment and for
higher spending on education and research. Comprehen-
sive tax cuts have entered into force in recent years and
the national tax rate has fallen to a historical low. The
price of the cuts has been a reduction in spending in the
areas mentioned above; it has not been possible to
absorb the decline in the tax rate by means of a corre-
sponding reduction in tax concessions.
A higher VAT rate could also be used, however, to
finance social security in a more sound way, that is, to
once again strengthen the equivalence principle in the
social insurance system. Considerations of this kind are
directed in particular at non-insurance benefits, which
have rocketed skywards in Germany, not least as a con-
sequence of German reunification. If a larger share of
these benefits were financed from tax revenue, it would
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expand the group of contributors. At the same time, this
restructuring of the system would lead to a reduction in
labor costs, improving the competitiveness of German
enterprises on international markets. Simulation calcula-
tions show that sizeable positive employment effects
could be achieved in this way, and this remains true
when the burden on those who previously did not partic-
ipate in financing non-insurance benefits is also taken
into account.
An increase in VAT could, therefore, make a lot of
sense; any verdict on its wisdom essentially depends on
the questions as to when it should be implemented and
how the resources gained should be deployed. A VAT
increase should not be pushed through during the cur-
rent phase of weak growth, but the situation will change
when the recovery has taken hold. The regressive dis-
tributive effect could be tempered if the reduced VAT
rates were increased only partly or not at all. In any
case, the prospect of additional revenue should not pre-
vent political decision makers from combing the domain
of tax concessions in search of other possibilities for
reductions. The concessions under examination should
not, however, by any means include only those granted
to workers in the form of subsidies for owner-occupied
housing construction, flat-rate mileage allowances, or
tax-free bonuses for night work and Sunday work.
Other areas that deserve equal scrutiny are tax conces-
sions granted to enterprises, measures to close tax loop-
holes _ a problem that has been sorely neglected in the
past _ and the V.A.T exemption for postal enterprises. If
the goal is further reductions in tax rates for enterprises,
then there will be no way to avoid reviewing the rela-
tively favorable regulations on profit assessment,
including the area of write-offs, in other words compar-
ing 'visible' with effective tax rates. Then, however, the
quandary facing policy makers would become evident:
Reducing the visible tax rate would result in less favor-
able depreciation conditions, and nothing would be
gained for investments.
Monetary policy
The ECB is facing a dilemma. On the one hand, growth
has weakened further in the euro zone _ a situation that
would call for an expansionary monetary policy stance.
On the other, for several years now in the euro zone
money supply has been rising at a stronger rate than
nominal GDP _ a situation that may have led to the
accumulation of an inflationary potential. However,
portfolio restructuring in favor of liquid forms of invest-
ment has probably exaggerated the increase in money
supply. The core inflation rate gives no indication of
inflationary pressure; it last amounted to 1.3% in the
euro zone and to 0.9% in Germany. The ECB is basing
its decision not to switch to a more expansionary stance
on the dispersion of the inflation rates in the euro zone,
which is accompanied by price bubbles on the property
markets. DIW Berlin analyses demonstrate that there
are many reasons for the differences in inflation rates,
but that the weight of these factors is constantly
decreasing with the result that the dispersion is gradu-
ally diminishing (cf. special section 'Inflation differen-
tials in the euro zone', pp. 259 ff).
The ECB cannot fail to recognize _ in light of the cur-
rent ailing economic situation in many member coun-
tries and of the criticism targeted at the European insti-
tutions _ that more is expected of it than only monitor-
ing price stability. The example of the U.S. Federal
Reserve with its distinctly anti-cyclical monetary policy
casts a shadow over the rigid attitude of the ECB. The
bank must act now. This forecast is therefore based on
the assumption that monetary policy will be relaxed.
Base rates will be reduced by 0.5 percentage points by
the end of the year. A step of this kind would emit a pos-
itive signal, even if the impulses for growth will proba-
bly remain moderate all the same (cf. figure 2).
The concern that a reduction in interest rates could
further inflate the property bubble in some EMU coun-
tries is unfounded, for the central banks of the individ-
ual countries still have a measure of freedom with
respect to national monetary policy. Each country can
lay down its own upper limits regarding debt financing
of both property and securities. It is therefore up to the
individual national central banks to use their room for
maneuver to impose a more restrictive monetary policy.
Labor market policy
A series of labor market reforms, some of them pro-
found, have been introduced in recent years. Because it
will take time for the measures introduced to take full
effect, only a few basic evaluations can be presented
here. 
Advanced training measures for the unemployed
should be more closely geared to the goal of future rein-
tegration into the labor market. Policy makers have laid
down a placement rate of 70% for persons who have
participated in vocational qualification schemes. The
likely result of this policy is that the people being
selected for Advanced and Vocational Training mea-
sures are those who already have relatively good pros-
pects on the labor market, so that other unemployed,
who are in particularly dire need of a qualification, are
being excluded. Even more significant is the assumptionDIW Berlin Weekly Report No. 21/2005  257
that _ despite mass unemployment _ there is a lack of
skilled labor that can be filled by this very measure.
Measures of this kind can indeed be very effective if
there really is a shortage of skilled labor. The shortage
is likely to be slight, however, in a period of high unem-
ployment and weak economic growth. In this case, then,
there is a substantial risk of participants in qualification
measures displacing other persons on the labor market
('carousel' effect).
Numerous 'Ich AG' businesses have been founded on
the basis of aid for business start-ups without the plans
behind them first being assessed for viability. It is possi-
ble that this type of support has been used by people
who feared they would no longer be eligible for unem-
ployment benefit under the new regulations. Viability
assessments are now being carried out since the end of
2004, with the result that since February of this year
there has been a massive decline in the number of subsi-
dies for business start-ups being granted. Clearly only a
few of the start-up projects submitted were considered
viable.
Personnel Service Agencies (PSAs) have not lived up
to expectations. The stocks of people registered for
placement with these agencies amounted to only 26 000
in May and has hardly changed in months. In addition,
the integration rate of only one-third is disappointing,
although it is certainly also a reflection of the difficult
situation on the labor market.
Without question, the most important reform is the
fusion of unemployment assistance and social welfare
benefit into Unemployment Benefit II (Hartz IV). The
aim of this reform is to increase the incentive for the
unemployed to actively seek work _ and especially low-
paid work _ by reducing their benefits. Basically, then,
the goal is a shift in the wage structure such that
employment in the low-wage sector increases. A politi-
cal debate is currently being waged on the question of
relaxing regulations so as to offer the unemployed more
opportunities for earning additional income, but this
would create incentives in exactly the opposite direction
and reduce the strength of the original mechanism. If,
moreover, some of the earned income were not taken
into account at all in the calculation of unemployment
benefit, the result would be a risk of beneficiaries for-
mally declaring only earned income that did not exceed
the stipulated allowance, while any income above and
beyond this figure would not be revealed. This would
practically amount to an open invitation to take up illicit
employment in this form because it would be so difficult
to detect.
Finally, the reforms also seek to provide better sup-
port for the unemployed via the employment agencies.
There is evidently still much room for improvement
here, with the shortfalls up to now being blamed on
problems related to the switch to Hartz IV. One can only
hope that counseling and placement will be rapidly
improved.
The amount of employment provided under Art. 16
SGB II (Social Security Statutes II), that is, employment
in 'one euro jobs', has remained far inferior to the goals
set. A total of 600 000 jobs of this kind were announced,
but only 130 000 have been created, and their number
has hardly risen at all in recent months. The probable
reason is that these jobs by definition must be in the
non-profit sector and constitute additional employment,
so as to avoid creating competition with private suppli-
ers where jobs could be displaced. In addition, govern-
ment institutions are not permitted to resort to one-euro
jobbers for tasks they have carried out themselves to
date, so as to avoid displacement of regular jobs in the
public sector. There are many examples of displacement
effects of this kind having already taken place. This
measure illustrates the danger of the principle of remu-
nerating useful employment in accordance with market
conditions being counteracted by labor market policy.
Wages policy
Wages policy has a dual task with respect to the overall
economy. On the one hand, if wages policy is to promote
stability and neutral distribution, then increases in
hourly wages must be based on trend productivity
growth while also taking the appropriate (target) infla-
tion rate for price stability into consideration. On the
other hand, wages policy must bear in mind that unem-
ployment has reached record levels in Germany (for the
trend for labor productivity and wages and salaries in
Germany and the euro zone, cf. figures 5 and 6).
A productivity-oriented wages policy plays an
important role in stabilizing disposable income, which is
a crucial determinant behind the growth of domestic
demand. This kind of wages policy should be planned
for the medium term and should not pass on short-term
fluctuations in labor productivity and inflation - for
example, those following oil-price shocks - in the form of
erratic wage fluctuations. This approach prevents tem-
porary shocks from having second-round effects and
stabilizes the economy. Seen from the long-term perspec-
tive, then, the guiding principle for wages policy in Ger-
many and the other EMU countries should be deter-
mined by the sum of the ECB's target inflation rate of
almost 2% and the average productivity growth of the
individual member state in question. In Germany, a rise
in hourly wages of around 3% would be compatible
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In the neoclassical labor market model, persisting
underemployment indicates a substantial gap between
the real rate of pay and the marginal productivity of the
unemployed. This remains true when one looks at the
average level of real wages, since nominal wages in Ger-
many exceeded distribution-neutral levels (and occa-
sionally significantly so) during the course of reunifica-
tion at the beginning of the 1990s, although inflation
was moderate overall. Financing the costs of German
reunification is still a burden on labor costs and contin-
ues to dampen employment growth. Much more impor-
tant, however, is the fact that the magnitude of the
imbalance between productivity and the respective real
wage varies very substantially across the different part-
time labor markets. This situation is made particularly
evident by the high share of low-skilled workers
amongst the long-term unemployed in Germany. In view
of substantial differences in the profits being earned
between regions and sectors as well as within sectors, a
sharp general rise in negotiated wages that failed to take
account of the variety of profit situations could lead to
further job losses.
An approach to wages policy that gives consider-
ation to employment figures must take adequate
account of both aspects. This can be done, for example,
through a combination of two measures. On the one
hand, a larger wage differential between sectors and
enterprises should be sought, in addition to the estab-
lishment of a low-wage sector. In this case, consider-
ation would have to be given to the compatibility of
incentives. On the other, there is still the problem of
excessively high labor costs, including ancillary wage
costs. If non-insurance benefits were financed out of
general tax revenue, labor costs could be reduced.
According to DIW Berlin calculations, this financing
solution, achieved via a VAT increase, could create sev-
eral hundred thousand new jobs. An even more job-
friendly solution would be counter-financing through
the abolition of subsidies.
All in all, a 3% rise in average negotiated wages
would be appropriate under these circumstances. If, at
the same time, ancillary wage costs were reduced fol-
lowing an increase in VAT, the rise in labor costs _ by
one percentage point _ would be much lower for enter-
Figure 5
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prises. If there were no sign of a reduction in ancillary
wage costs, then a lower wage rise _ of around 1.5% to
2%  _ is recommended in order to further reduce the
imbalances created at the beginning of the 1990s. How-
ever, a strategy of this kind can only bear fruit if it is
possible to maintain the increase in prices superior to a
nominal wage rise that has been adjusted for productiv-
ity growth; in other words, if unit labor costs increase at
a weaker rate than the general price level. Today's core
inflation rate is 0.9% in Germany, and so this condition
is currently fulfilled. A further reduction in the inflation
rate should be avoided, however. This means effective
demand must be stabilized via the instruments provided
by monetary and fiscal policy.
At the same time, the scope for a sharper differentia-
tion of negotiated wage increases should be used. In
addition, enterprises that are earning well can pay
wages that exceed negotiated rates or share profits with
their staff by means of bonuses.
Inflation Differentials
in the Euro Zone
The inflation rates of the EMU countries have exhibited
extremely different trends since the launch of monetary
union. The variance of the inflation rates, which had
fallen sharply during the process of convergence in the
run-up to EMU, expanded tremendously subsequent to
1999. While the dispersion of the inflation rates has
diminished again to an extent since early 2004, the dif-
ferences are still broader than they were during the con-
vergence process.
This phenomenon is often interpreted as indicating
that the common monetary policy does not do justice to
the economic situation of the individual member coun-
tries. Those who espouse this point of view argue that
monetary union reinforces divergences in economic
growth, which are then manifested in diverging inflation
rates. Instead of having a stabilizing effect on demand,
these observers contend, monetary union amplifies eco-
nomic imbalances and impedes stable and enduring
growth.
This view is based on the fact that in a monetary
union two possible instruments used for adjusting to
changing supply and demand conditions are no longer
available at national level. Thus, base interest rates are
fixed on the basis of the average for the euro zone. Like-
wise, in the event of certain wage and price rigidities, it
is impossible to achieve an increase in demand and an
improvement in the competitiveness of a single country
with the help of the nominal exchange rate. Even when
the EMS was in force many countries had based their
exchange rate on the deutschmark as anchor currency
and did not therefore have free scope in their monetary
and exchange rate policies, but the margin of fluctuation
and the possibility of changing the central parity rate
still left them with some room for maneuver. This scope
was used in particular by countries with higher inflation
rates to restore competitiveness via currency deprecia-
tions.
In the EMU, adjustments to changing supply and
demand conditions must, as a rule, be carried out
directly via prices and wages. While it is possible to
respond to temporary asymmetrical shocks with fiscal
policy interventions, long-term adjustments require a
change in the price level and the real wage. The need to
carry out adjustments via prices and wages is reinforced
by the fact that real interest rates react inversely in the
EMU. They are lower in countries with higher inflation
rates, which additionally bolsters demand. By contrast,
pressure to correct possible imbalances within the mone-
tary union is exerted by foreign demand. Here, too, the
correction can only take effect following a relatively
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by the disappearance of the risk premiums for exchange
rate fluctuations. If corrections only take place at a rela-
tively late point in time, then a process of this kind can
be accompanied by high swings in the price trend and in
growth.
In addition, an adjustment process can be made
more difficult by the fact that the reactions of the indi-
vidual EMU countries vary. For example, the indexing
regulations used in some countries mean above-average
inflation rates can be reduced only slowly. Likewise, the
doses in which anti-cyclical fiscal policy measures are
delivered can vary. Overall, there is always the risk that
a monetary policy based on averages will end up not
satisfying any country.
However, different inflation rates are not a problem
in themselves for stability in the monetary union. On the
contrary, they represent a remaining adjustment mecha-
nism when national economies are exposed in different
ways to changes in supply and demand conditions. Cor-
rections to the relative price level and to competitiveness
can only be achieved via a change in prices themselves.
In addition, inflation differentials can also be caused by
factors that have only temporary character or have no
impact at all on competitiveness.
All in all, differences in inflation rates can have the
following causes:
–   price level convergence;
–   differences in the weighting of the HICP categories;
–   adjustments of indirect taxes and regulated prices;
–   structural differences in responses to shocks and
asynchronous economic trends;
–  adjustment  of  interest  rates and exchange rates on
entry into monetary union.
Price level convergence probably played only a
minor role in creating the differences in inflation rates in
the initial years of monetary union. The adjustment of
the prices of tradable goods is a very slow process
because not all transaction costs (e.g., transport costs)
are reduced by the advent of a common market. Market
segmentation, differences in indirect taxes, the market
power of particular suppliers, language barriers, habits,
and cultural diversity can all also have an impact even
after the foundation of the single market. Similarly, the
adjustment of the prices of non-tradable goods accord-
ing to the Balassa-Samuelson model was also only mar-
ginally responsible for the differentials. On the one
hand, convergence is a long-term process; on the other, it
is very difficult to prove the impact of the Balassa-Sam-
uelson effect in the countries in the monetary union. 
While differences in the weights of the HICP catego-
ries may be significant, in that the same price increases
have a different impact on the inflation rate of each
country, this effect is only temporary and is irrelevant
for monetary policy.
By contrast, adjustments of indirect taxes and regu-
lated prices had a substantial impact. Up to now, both
VAT and indirect tax rates (excise duties for tobacco
and alcoholic drinks, for example), as well as fees for
public services, vary across the EMU countries. Adjust-
ments of regulated prices are equally not uniform.
Increases can be determined by the need to consolidate
the public budgets (such as in Germany, France, and
Portugal in recent years), but also by theoretical consid-
erations related to demand-side management (e.g., eco-
logical taxes in various EMU countries) or to the distri-
bution of the tax burden (e.g., the shift from direct to
indirect taxes in the Netherlands at the beginning of
2001). Another possibility is a reduction in indirect taxes
such as that carried out in Finland for alcohol tax in
2004; this was a major factor behind the negative infla-
tion rates shown for a number of months. Long-term
inflation differentials only accrue from changes in tax
rates and regulated prices if second-round effects arise
via wage increases or if growth effects are prompted by
adjustments in purchasing power.
The emergence of a shock, for example a rise in the
oil price or an abrupt change in the exchange rate, will
produce differences in the inflation rates. First, a shock
of this kind does not necessarily have the same impact
on different national economies, so that the extent of
adjustment required will vary. There are substantial dis-
crepancies both with respect to countries' dependence on
oil and with respect to the weight of energy prices in the
HICP. Likewise, the share of member countries' GDP
accounted for by imports and the significance of exter-
nal trade with non-EMU countries is not consistent. The
effects of a change in exchange rates on the price index
and on growth will therefore vary.
Secondly, the adjustment processes themselves can
diverge. A long-term rise in the oil price results in real
income losses that must be accepted by wage-earners. If
wages are raised in order to compensate the loss, then
the adjustment process is prolonged; if the amount of
this compensation varies across the member countries,
then over the long term differences in their inflation
rates will emerge. How long these disparities last will
depend on the second-round effects triggered by wage
increases. While a strong currency depreciation exerts
pressure on prices in just the same way as a rise in the
oil price, it also represents an impulse for growth. The
consequences for the duration and intensity of the infla-
tion differences are then also determined by the extent
to which changes in competitiveness must be corrected
with respect to the other countries in the monetary
union.
After the oil-price shock, it was actually possible to
observe wage increases drifting apart in the euro zone.
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higher than previously in 2001, as was the variance
between them. This suggests that compensation pay-
ments were made in some countries to offset the price
shock, leading to second-round effects, whereas in other
countries this did not happen. Nonetheless, it is still true
that the increases in nominal wages in reaction to the
price thrusts of the years 2000 and 2001 were relatively
low compared with periods prior to the introduction of
monetary union. However, this does not apply to the
years 1996 to 1998, when the EMU countries were focus-
ing on meeting the criteria for nominal convergence.
There were several reasons for the divergence of the
inflation rates following the shocks. First, indexing
clauses further prolonged the adjustment process in
some countries. Second, the sharp depreciation of the
euro initially compensated for a possible loss in compet-
itiveness within the EMU. The slowdown in adjustment
was reinforced by the inverse effect of real interest rates.
Third, the pace of economic growth was already incon-
sistent across the different countries prior to the shock.
For example, there were indications of overheating in
both Portugal and the Netherlands, while at the same
time other economies were expanding only moderately.
The laborious adjustment process following shocks
at the beginning of monetary union could also be related
to teething problems and difficulties with the transition
to the new system. Thus, having to depend on the ECB's
inflation target as the only nominal anchor was a nov-
elty for most countries. Apart from Germany, each coun-
try's exchange rate with the deutschmark previously
played a significant role as an indicator of ECB policy
and for the generation of inflation expectations. In Ger-
many, by contrast, monetary policy was based on
national trends, while interest-rate policy helped to sta-
bilize demand. The standard for expectation formation
has changed in Germany from the implicit price norm,
which was based on the domestic situation, to the ECB
inflation target for the euro zone as a whole; in the other
countries it has shifted from the implicit or explicit
exchange rate target (combined with a money supply or
inflation target) to exclusively the inflation target. It is
possible that the understanding of the change in the
variables on which expectation formation is based is
still prone to teething problems.
Moreover, several countries showed a substantial
decline in real interest rates _ in some cases even arriv-
ing at negative rates _ during the process of nominal
interest rate convergence. The Long-term equilibrium
capital stock is now higher, and adjustment to this path
could take several years. The growth impulse exerted
by the reduced real interest rates could overcompensate
for the potential negative consequences of inflation dif-
ferentials and deteriorating competitiveness for a certain
period of time.
In addition, there may have been a need to correct
the entry exchange rates. In order to avoid corrections
immediately after the launch of monetary union,
exchange rates should have been fixed at a level that
would correspond in the long term to the relative prices
between the national economies. During the preparatory
phase it was considered prudent for reasons of credibil-
ity that each country should enter monetary union with
the exchange rate that had been accepted by the market.
In Spain and Italy, in particular, exchange rates were at
the relatively low level that had taken hold following the
depreciations in 1992 and 1993 and the subsequent only
minor corrections. These rates also included risk dis-
counts based on the greater degree of uncertainty con-
cerning inflation and exchange rate trends as well as
participation in the EMU. Germany, by contrast, joined
with a relatively high real exchange rate - on the one
hand, because of the upturn in prices during the course
of German reunification and, on the other, because of the
nominal appreciation during the EMS crisis. However,
the asymmetric shock of German reunification necessi-
tated a subsequent real depreciation, and this was not
able to occur until after monetary union because of the
nominal convergence process taking place at the time in
the countries in the euro zone.
Differences in the inflation rates of the EMU coun-
tries can also be expected in the future. However, they
are likely to be narrower than in the first few years fol-
lowing the introduction of monetary union. Possible
transitional effects will wear off, and the adjustment
mechanisms will be based on the situation in the EMU.
However, to this end the adjustment of prices and real
wages must become more flexible. Likewise, the possi-
bilities for anti-cyclical fiscal policy must be strength-
ened. Experience with monetary union to date has
shown that the countries whose inflation rates deviate
most conspicuously and persistently from the EMU
average are those for whom entry into the monetary
union meant being deprived for the first time ever of the
adjustment instruments provided by the exchange rate
(Spain, Portugal, Italy) or of an independent monetary
policy (Germany).262 DIW Berlin Weekly Report No. 21/2005
Appendix 1
Federal Republic of Germany
Key National Accounts Data – Estimate and Forecast for 2005 to 2006
2004 2005 2006
2005 2006
1st half 2nd half 1st half 2nd half
1. Components of GDP
Change (%) on the previous year
Employed labour force (domestic) 0.4 0.6 0.8 0.5 0.7 0.9 0.8
Working hours –1.1 0.2 0.4 –0.7 1.0 –0.1 0.9
Working days 1.5 –0.7 –0.7 –0.1 –1.2 0.0 –1.3
Labour volume (by calendar month)1 0.8 0.1 0.6 –0.2 0.4 0.8 0.3
Productivity2 0.8 0.8 0.9 1.1 0.4 0.4 1.4
Gross domestic product at 1995 prices 1.6 0.9 1.5 0.9 0.9 1.2 1.7
2. GDP by type of expenditure at current prices
a) Euro billion
Private consumption3 1 304.2 1 325.6 1 352.2 645.3 680.3 662.8 689.4
Government consumption 412.9 412.6 416.1 196.8 215.7 198.8 217.2
Gross investment 381.3 364.1 371.2 186.6 177.5 187.2 184.0
Fixed capital formation 379.5 374.0 379.5 178.4 195.7 179.5 200.1
Machinery, equipment and other 148.4 151.9 157.4 71.3 80.6 73.6 83.9
Construction 206.3 196.8 196.3 94.8 102.0 93.4 102.9
Domestic demand 2 098.4 2 102.2 2 139.5 1 028.8 1 073.5 1 048.9 1 090.6
Exports 838.6 888.3 956.5 434.5 453.9 466.3 490.2
Imports 729.7 745.5 793.7 360.9 384.6 383.2 410.5
Gross domestic product 2 207.2 2 245.0 2 302.3 1 102.3 1 142.7 1 131.9 1 170.3
b) Change (%) on the previous year
Private consumption3  1.4  1.6  2.0  1.3  1.9  2.7  1.3
Government consumption –0.4 –0.1  0.8 –0.4  0.2  1.0  0.7
Gross investment  1.0 –4.5  2.0  0.2 –9.0  0.3  3.7
Fixed capital formation –0.3 –1.4  1.5 –0.8 –2.1  0.6  2.3
Machinery, equipment and other  1.0  2.3  3.7  3.7  1.1  3.1  4.1
Construction –1.4 –4.6 –0.3 –4.2 –5.0 –1.5  0.9
Domestic demand  1.0  0.2  1.8  0.8 –0.4  2.0  1.6
Exports  9.1  5.9  7.7  5.4  6.5  7.3  8.0
Imports  7.0  2.2  6.5  3.7  0.8  6.2  6.7
Gross domestic product  2.0  1.7  2.5  1.6  1.8  2.7  2.4
3. GDP by type of expenditure, price-adjusted, chain-linked index (2000 = 100)
b) Change (%) on the previous year
Private consumption3 –0.1  0.2  0.6  0.1  0.2  0.7  0.5
Government consumption –0.7 –0.2  0.3 –0.6  0.2  0.4  0.2
Gross investment  4.0 –5.6  0.8 –1.5 –9.6 –1.5  3.3
Fixed capital formation –0.5 –1.6  1.2 –0.9 –2.2  0.3  2.0
Machinery, equipment and other  2.3  3.3  4.2  5.2  1.6  3.7  4.6
Construction –2.6 –5.7 –1.3 –5.6 –5.7 –2.5 –0.1
Domestic demand  0.6 –1.0  0.6 –0.4 –1.5  0.3  0.8
Exports  9.0  5.7  7.2  5.1  6.3  6.8  7.5
Imports  6.7  1.3  5.8  2.5  0.3  5.6  6.0
Gross domestic product  1.6  0.9  1.5  0.9  0.9  1.2  1.7DIW Berlin Weekly Report No. 21/2005  263
Appendix 1 (contd)
Federal Republic of Germany
Key National Accounts Data – Estimate and Forecast for 2005 to 2006
2004 2005 2006
2005 2006
1st half 2nd half 1st half 2nd half
4. GDP by type of expenditure: price level of domestic demand
b) Change (%) on the previous year
Private consumption3 1.5 1.5 1.4 1.2 1.7 2.0 0.8
Government consumption 0.3 0.1 0.5 0.2 0.0 0.6 0.5
Gross investment –2.8 1.2 1.1 1.7 0.7 1.9 0.4
Fixed capital formation 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.3
Exports 0.1 0.2 0.5 0.3 0.2 0.5 0.5
Imports 0.2 0.8 0.6 1.2 0.4 0.6 0.6
Gross domestic product 0.4 0.8 1.1 0.6 0.9 1.5 0.7
5. Origin and distribution of income
a) Euro billion
Compensation of employees 1 134.3 1 139.0 1 154.7 540.6 598.4 547.4 607.3
Wages and salaries, gross 912.3 919.3 934.8 434.1 485.2 441.3 493.6
Wages and salaries, net 600.7 610.3 619.2 285.6 324.8 288.7 330.5
Entrepreneurial and property income, gross 501.8 539.2 584.4 274.5 264.7 300.0 284.4
National income 1 636.1 1 678.2 1 739.1 815.1 863.1 847.4 891.7
Gross national income 2 196.7 2 239.5 2 290.4 1 099.2 1 140.3 1 122.4 1 167.9
b) Change (%) on the previous year
Compensation of employees 0.2 0.4 1.4 –0.2 0.9 1.3 1.5
Wages and salaries, gross 0.3 0.8 1.7 0.1 1.4 1.7 1.7
Wages and salaries, net 2.0 1.6 1.5 0.8 2.3 1.1 1.8
Wages and salaries, gross per employee 0.4 0.6 1.0 0.1 1.0 0.9 1.1
Wages and salaries, net per employee 2.1 1.4 0.7 0.8 1.9 0.3 1.1
Entrepreneurial and property income, gross  7.0  7.5  8.4  6.5  8.5  9.3  7.4
National income  2.2  2.6  3.6  2.0  3.1  4.0  3.3
Gross national income 2.2 1.9 2.3 2.0 1.9 2.1 2.4
6. Private households' incomes and expenditure
a) Euro billion
Mass income 978.5 983.3 986.7 473.9 509.3 473.5 513.2
Wages and salaries, net 600.7 610.3 619.2 285.6 324.8 288.7 330.5
Monetary social benefits 457.9 454.9 450.8 229.6 225.3 226.6 224.3
Minus: charges on social benefits4 80.1 81.9 83.3 41.2 40.8 41.8 41.6
Other primary income5 497.5 516.2 538.0 270.5 245.7 288.4 249.6
Other transfers received, net6 –35.3 –36.2 –33.9 –18.9 –17.3 –17.9 –16.0
Disposable income7 1 440.7 1 463.3 1 490.8 725.6 737.8 744.0 746.8
Memo item: increase in claims 
on company pension schemes 18.7 20.3 22.3 9.5 10.9 10.5 11.9
Private consumption3 1 304.2 1 325.6 1 352.2 645.3 680.3 662.8 689.4
Current savings 155.3 158.1 160.9 89.7 68.4 91.6 69.3
Savings ratio8 10.6 10.7 10.6 12.2 9.1 12.1 9.1
b) Change (%) on the previous year
Mass income  1.3  0.5  0.3  0.2  0.7 –0.1  0.8
Wages and salaries, net  2.0  1.6  1.5  0.8  2.3  1.1  1.8
Monetary social benefits  0.9 –0.6 –0.9 –0.1 –1.2 –1.3 –0.5
Minus: charges on social benefits4  4 . 2 2 . 3 1 . 7 2 . 5 2 . 0 1 . 5 2 . 0
Other primary income5  1 . 0 3 . 8 4 . 2 4 . 2 3 . 3 6 . 6 1 . 6
Disposable income7 1.2 1.6 1.9 1.4 1.7 2.5 1.2
Private consumption3 1.4 1.6 2.0 1.3 1.9 2.7 1.3
Current savings 0.8 1.8 1.8 2.5 0.9 2.1 1.3264 DIW Berlin Weekly Report No. 21/2005
Appendix 1 (contd)
Federal Republic of Germany
Key National Accounts Data – Estimate and Forecast for 2005 to 2006
2004 2005 2006
2005 2006
1st half 2nd half 1st half 2nd half
7. Government revenue and expenditure9
a) Euro billion
Revenue
Taxes 482.0 484.9 496.2 237.7 247.3 243.8 252.4
Social contributions 396.5 398.8 401.7 194.2 204.6 195.4 206.3
Property income 11.6 10.2 10.5 5.3 4.9 5.6 4.9
Other current transfers10 66.2 70.2 68.5 34.9 35.3 32.6 35.9
Total revenue 956.2 964.0 976.9 472.0 492.1 477.4 499.5
Expenditure
Inputs11 254.7 258.1 262.7 123.6 134.4 125.8 136.9
Compensation of employees 166.6 165.8 164.7 78.5 87.3 78.0 86.7
Property income, transferred 63.5 67.9 70.0 33.6 34.3 34.7 35.3
Subsidies 27.5 26.0 25.0 12.4 13.6 12.0 13.0
Social benefits 423.3 426.0 426.6 213.5 212.5 213.8 212.9
Private households 418.4 421.0 421.5 211.0 210.0 211.2 210.3
Rest of the world 4.9 5.0 5.1 2.5 2.5 2.6 2.6
Other current transfers 38.0 35.1 40.9 17.8 17.3 20.5 20.5
Capital transfers 33.6 34.9 32.2 19.4 15.5 18.0 14.2
Gross investment 30.4 29.9 31.0 12.9 17.0 13.2 17.8
Net increase in non-produced capital goods –1.5 –1.5 –1.5 –0.7 –0.8 –0.7 –0.8
Total expenditure 1 036.2 1 042.1 1 051.7  510.9  531.2  515.2  536.5
Deficit/surplus –80.0 –78.0 –74.8 –39.0 –39.1 –37.8 –37.0
b) Change (%) on the previous year
Revenue
Taxes  0.0  0.6  2.3  0.4  0.8  2.6  2.1
Social contributions  0.4  0.6  0.7  0.5  0.7  0.6  0.8
Property income –32.1 –12.3  3.6 –9.5 –15.1  7.0  0.0
Other current transfers10  0.1  6.0 –2.4  11.8  0.9 –6.6  1.7
Total revenue –0.4  0.8  1.3  1.1  0.6  1.2  1.5
Expenditure
Inputs11 –0.4 1.3 1.8 1.4 1.3 1.8 1.9
Compensation of employees –0.9 –0.5 –0.7 –0.3 –0.6 –0.6 –0.7
Property income, transferred –0.4 6.9 3.1 6.7 7.0 3.3 2.9
Subsidies –4.9 –5.7 –3.7 –7.7 –3.9 –2.8 –4.4
Social benefits 0.8 0.6 0.1 0.4 0.9 0.1 0.2
Private households 0.8 0.6 0.1 0.3 0.9 0.1 0.1
Rest of the world 6.0 2.4 2.0 2.0 2.9 2.4 1.6
Other current transfers –1.5 –7.7 16.6 –3.3 –11.7 14.9 18.4
Capital transfers –5.8 4.0 –7.7 1.9 6.6 –7.2 –8.4
Gross investment –4.6 –1.9 3.9 –2.9 –1.1 2.7 4.7
Net increase in non-produced capital goods              –              –              –              –              –              –              –
Total expenditure –0.5  0.6  0.9  0.5  0.6  0.8  1.0
1 Calculations by the Institute for Research on Employment and by the DIW Berlin. — 2 Gross domestic product, price-adjusted, chain-linked index (2000 = 100), per hour
worked. — 3 Incl. private non-profit organisations. — 4 Incl. consumption-related taxes. — 5 Self-employed income/operating profits plus property income received minus prop-
erty income losses. — 6 Transfers received minus other transfers. — 7 Expenditure concept. — 8 Savings as a percentage of disposable income. — 9 Federal, state and local
government and social security funds. — 10 Other current transfers. Capital transfers. Sales and other subsidies. — 11 Incl. social benefits in kind and other production charges.
Sources: Federal Statistical Office (Series 18 of the National Accounts); DIW Berlin calculations.DIW Berlin Weekly Report No. 21/2005  265
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